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Abstract
Is ﬁnancial literacy a substitute or complement for ﬁnancial advice? We analyze the decision
by consumers to seek ﬁnancial advice in the form of credit counseling. Credit counseling is
an important component of the consumer credit sector for consumers facing debt problems.
Our analysis accounts for the endogeneity of an individual’s ﬁnancial situation to ﬁnancial
literacy, and the endogeneity of ﬁnancial literacy to exposure to credit counseling. Results
show counseling substitutes for ﬁnancial literacy. Individuals with better literacy are 60% less
likely to use credit counseling. These results suggest that credit counseling provides a safety
net for poor ﬁnancial literacy.
JEL CODES: D10, D12, I22
Keywords: Credit counseling, ﬁnancial advice, ﬁnancial literacy, household ﬁnance.
1 Introduction
This paper estimates the impact of ﬁnancial literacy on the demand for ﬁnancial ad-
vice, speciﬁcally the demand for professional ‘credit counseling’ among consumers fa-
cing ﬁnancial problems. Credit counseling services offer advice to consumers
regarding their credit and debt and are commonly used by individuals with problem
debt, such as late payments on a credit card. The consequences of poor ﬁnancial lit-
eracy might be less severe if consumers can turn to the assistance of a credit counselor
when faced with a ﬁnancial problem or challenge. We focus on credit counseling as
consumers with debt problems typically exhibit low levels of income and wealth
and low levels of ﬁnancial literacy, so the marginal utility of advice is likely to be
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high for this group compared with wealthier households. We show that, for a given
debt problem, a one-unit increase in ﬁnancial literacy on our four-point index
decreases the likelihood of an individual seeking help and assistance from a credit
counselor by approximately 60%. Our results support the view that credit counseling
is a substitute, and maybe acts as a safety net, for poor ﬁnancial literacy.
Our focus on the relationship between ﬁnancial literacy and ﬁnancial advice in the
form of credit counseling differs from the previous literature which has focused on ﬁnan-
cial advice provided by investment advisors. A number of studies show that ﬁnancial
literacy and the advice of professional investment advisors are typically complements
(Hackethal et al., 2012; Bucher-Koenen and Koenen, 2015). Recently, Calcagno and
Monticone (2015) have shown that, among a sample of Italian investors, those with
poor literacy are less likely to seek investment advice. Collins (2012) shows that investors
with low levels of ﬁnancial literacy aremore likely to invest without seeking advice.Willis
(2011) discusses the role of ﬁnancial education as a substitute for ﬁnancial advice.
To our knowledge, the interplay between ﬁnancial literacy and ﬁnancial advice in the
speciﬁc form of credit counseling has not been investigated in much of the prior litera-
ture. Two prior studies consider the interplay between low ﬁnancial literacy and ﬁnan-
cial services. Bernheim (1995) shows that many workers are unaware of their ﬁnancial
illiteracy, suggesting they may not realize the need for ﬁnancial advice. Cole et al. (2011)
show individuals with better ﬁnancial literacy are more likely to choose basic ﬁnancial
services, such as bank accounts. Two other recent studies analyze the relationship be-
tween ﬁnancial literacy and the effects of ﬁnancial advice in the mortgage market.
Moulton et al. (2013) argue that ﬁrst-time home-buyers who underestimate or overesti-
mate their total debt or misunderstand monthly debt payments are more likely to seek
ﬁnancial counseling. Agarwal et al. (2014) ﬁnd that ﬁnancial counseling has no direct
effect on mortgage choices, but an indirect effect occurs via mandatory counseling dis-
couraging low credit score borrowers from applying for risky mortgages.
Other prior studies have shown that ﬁnancial literacy is important for savings be-
havior (Bernheim, 1995, 1998; Lusardi and Mitchell, 2007, 2011; Chan and
Stevens, 2008; Behrman et al., 2012), investment and portfolio decisions (Christelis
et al., 2010; van Rooij et al., 2011; Yoong, 2011) and choices in the credit market
(Lusardi and Tufano, 2009; Disney and Gathergood, 2013; Gerardi et al., 2013). In
addition, existing studies show that ﬁnancial literacy arises in part due to institutional
features, such as public provision of saving vehicles, but also familial background and
upbringing and education (Jappelli, 2010; Carpena et al., 2011). For a recent review
of the ﬁnancial literacy literature see Lusardi and Mitchell (2014).
Financial literacy is seen as key to ﬁnancial decision making and ﬁnancial inde-
pendence. Is ﬁnancial literacy, therefore, a substitute or a complement for credit coun-
seling? If an individual’s ﬁnancial literacy removes the need to seek advice about their
credit and debt from others in ﬁnancial decisions, then ﬁnancial literacy could be a
substitute for professional advice, which in many settings is available only at some
cost, including the time cost of liaising with an advisor. Alternatively, if credit coun-
seling is readily available at low cost, consumers might choose not to invest in learning
and use advice as a cheaper substitute. In both scenarios, ﬁnancial advice and ﬁnan-
cial literacy are substitutes.
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However, there may be reasons why ﬁnancial literacy and credit counseling act as
complements. Financial literacy might be important for the realization that counseling
advice is required. It might also be necessary in order to beneﬁt from counseling and to
put advice into practice. As such, ﬁnancial literacy may be a complement to credit
counseling. The potential for both substitution and complementarity between ﬁnancial
literacy and credit counseling is the key issue we address in this paper.
The context we focus on is that of ‘credit counseling’ in the consumer credit market.
Credit counseling is a form of ﬁnancial advice on credit and debt typically used by indi-
viduals facing over-indebtedness or problems relating to credit and debt repayment.
Credit counseling typically occurs via an interview with a client about their ﬁnancial situ-
ation which leads to some advice or an intervention provided by the credit counseling
agency. These may include negotiations with creditors, re-organization of client budgets
and repayment plans and potentially assistancewith bankruptcy ﬁlings. In theUK, credit
counseling is normally available for free from charities and/or government providers and
the most British users of credit counseling make use of free-to-client advice providers.
There is a large credit counseling sector in the US and UK comprising charitable and
fee charging advice providers. Staten (2006) estimates that 5–6 million US individuals
use a credit counseling advisor each year. For the UK, the Money Advice Service
(2013) estimates 2 million UK individuals seek advice from an advice provider. Nearly
all credit counseling occurs via the telephone or via the internet in the UK.
This context of consumer debt is particularly appropriate for analyzing whether
ﬁnancial advice can act as a ‘safety net’ for those with poor ﬁnancial literacy.
Individuals with credit and debt repayment problems typically show poor ﬁnancial lit-
eracy (Gathergood, 2012). Evidence on the effectiveness of credit counseling should
focus not just on the self-selection of individuals into credit counseling by their ﬁnan-
cial existing situation (as in Xiao et al., 2006; Elliehausen et al., 2007; Nurcan and
Bièáková, 2010), but also by their individual ﬁnancial capabilities. This latter question
lies at the heart of the present paper and we now turn to the methodology we use to
identify the relationship between ﬁnancial literacy and credit counseling.
2 Methodology
We use a unique survey dataset from the UK into which we inserted survey questions
on ﬁnancial literacy and other behavioral characteristics of consumers. Our dataset
comprises survey data for approximately 1,300 UK individuals with ﬁnancial pro-
blems, drawn from a subset of the YouGov Debt Tracker survey and collected in
October 2010. The Debt Tracker is a representative cross-sectional survey of approxi-
mately 3,000 UK individuals conducted on a quarterly basis since the year 2000. The
survey asks individuals about their ﬁnancial situation and the extent to which they
face debt problems on a self-reported scale. Individuals who state they sometimes
‘struggle’ with their ﬁnancial commitments then receive an additional series of ques-
tions on what steps they have taken to address their ﬁnancial commitments, including
use of credit counseling. This sample forms the analysis sample in our paper.
Our empirical approach is based on a dual strategy to address ﬁrst the endogeneity
of an individual’s debt problems to ﬁnancial literacy, and second the endogeneity of
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ﬁnancial literacy to exposure to credit counseling. In our data we observe an
individual’s ﬁnancial literacy as measured using survey questions, an individual’s
self-reported ﬁnancial situation and information on whether an individual has sought
professional credit counseling within the last 6 months. The ﬁrst component of our
empirical strategy is a Heckman selection correction model to address the endogeneity
of an individual’s debt problems to his or her ﬁnancial literacy. Our interest is in how
ﬁnancial literacy affects the decision to seek credit counseling when facing ﬁnancial
difﬁculty. However, ﬁnancial difﬁculty itself may be due to poor ﬁnancial literacy.
A negative relationship between ﬁnancial literacy and credit counseling could arise
because individuals with better ﬁnancial literacy are less likely to face debt problems,
and hence have less need for credit counseling.
We address this endogeneity problem by instrumenting selection into having a ‘debt
problem’ using a series of variables which capture exogenous shocks to the indivi-
dual’s ﬁnancial circumstance unrelated to ﬁnancial literacy. The shocks we exploit
are employment shocks, income shocks and health shocks. These are arguably ex-
ogenous to an individual’s ﬁnancial literacy but, as we show, predict the likelihood
of an individual facing a debt problem. Therefore, our results on the relationship be-
tween ﬁnancial literacy and credit counseling are estimated using exogenous variation
arising due to shocks.
Second, we instrument ﬁnancial literacy which may arise endogenously with receipt
of credit counseling. Our interest is in how ﬁnancial literacy affects the decision to
seek credit counseling, but in our data observed ﬁnancial literacy at the time of the
survey could arise due to the effects of credit counseling received previously. Credit
counseling often takes the form of advice relating to remedial actions for the client’s
ﬁnances, but also often includes the offer of ﬁnancial education opportunities. This
may create a reverse causation channel in our data.
We therefore adopt instrumental variables (IV) approach and instrument current
ﬁnancial literacy using the extent of economics- and ﬁnance education in school.
We combine this IV strategy with the Heckman selection model to create a two-step
estimation procedure which employs the selectivity correction adjustment and IV
method to account for these two forms of endogeneity simultaneously. We show
results with and without the two instrumental variable methods.
Ourkeyﬁnding is that, foragivendebtproblem,ﬁnancial literacy reduces the likelihood
that an individual seeks credit counseling. A one unit increase in ﬁnancial literacy, which
in our analysis means answering an additional ﬁnancial literacy question correctly,
reduces the likelihood of an individual seeking credit counseling by approximately
60%. This ﬁnding occurs in our baseline speciﬁcation without instruments, in a speciﬁca-
tion including theHeckman selectivity correction and in a hybridmodel that incorporates
the selectivity correction adjustment into an IVmodel in which ﬁnancial literacy is instru-
mented by early life ﬁnancial education. We conduct further robustness analysis to show
thisﬁnding isnot sensitive to the choice of shockvariableswe include in the selection equa-
tion or alternative deﬁnitions of ‘debt problem’ used in the selectivity correction model.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: in the next section we describe
the survey dataset, including the questions relating to ﬁnancial literacy which we
commissioned within the survey. This section also presents summary statistics for
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our data. Following that, the next section presents the econometric models. The pen-
ultimate section presents sensitivity analysis ahead of the conclusion.
3 Data and summary statistics
3.1 Survey summary
Our data drawn from the YouGov Debt Tracker survey focuses on consumer credit
and debt, including topics such as consumer debt product holdings, credit applica-
tions and repayment behavior and difﬁculties. The survey is conducted via the internet
once per quarter and takes approximately 40 min to complete. Individuals are paid
approximately £10 for participation. The survey sample is a representative cross-
section of the UK population. YouGov makes internet access available to households
without access to the internet at home in order to achieve a representative sample.
We now describe the construction of our ‘debt problem’ measure from the survey
and how it relates to the survey data design.
All respondents are asked early-on in the survey:
. ‘Which one of the following statements best describes how well you (and your partner)
are keeping up with your bills and credit commitments at the moment? ’
Respondents select one option from six categories:
(1) I am/we are keeping up with all bills and commitments without any difﬁculties;
(2) I am/we are keeping up with all bills and commitments, but it is a struggle from
time to time;
(3) I am/we are keeping all bills and commitments, but it is a constant struggle;
(4) I am/we are falling behind with some bills or credit commitments;
(5) I am/we are having real ﬁnancial problems and have fallen behind with many bills
or credit commitments;
(6) I/we do not have any bills or credit commitments.
Individuals who choose an answer (2–5) from the above list are identiﬁed as being at
risk of debt problems and are then asked further questions about their bills and credit
commitments, including details of problems repaying their debts and use of professional
credit counseling advice. Individuals who answer (1) or (6) are not asked these ques-
tions, and their use of professional credit counseling advice is not observed. The dataset
we use comprises 1,268 observations for individual respondents who answered (2–5).
All individuals in our sample are presented with a series of ﬁnancial literacy ques-
tions. These questions are based upon those constructed by Lusardi and Tufano
(2009). We have used them elsewhere in Gathergood (2012), Disney and
Gathergood (2013) and Gathergood and Weber (2014). The questions are designed
to test the respondent’s understanding of simple interest, compound interest and
(non-)amortization. The questions are framed in the context of consumer credit
debt which is relevant for our interest in credit counseling in particular.
The three ﬁnancial literacy questions are:
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1. ‘Cheryl owes £1,000 on her bank overdraft and the interest rate she is charged is
15% per year. If she did not pay anything off, at this interest rate, how much
money would she owe on her overdraft after 1 year?’
– £850
– £1,000
– £1,150
– £1,500
– Do not know
2. ‘Sarah owes £1,000 on her credit card and the interest rate she is charged is 20% per
year compounded annually. If she did not pay anything off, at this interest rate,
how many years would it take for the amount she owes to double?’
– Less than 5 years
– Between 5 and 10 years
– More than 10 years
– Do not know
3. ‘David has a credit card debt of £3,000 at an annual percentage rate of 12% (or 1%
per month). He makes payments of £30 per month and does not gain any charges
or additional spending on the card. How long will it take him to pay off this debt?’
– Less than 5 years
– Between 5 and 10 years
– More than 10 years
– None of the above, he will continue to be in debt
– Do not know
From respondents’ answers to these three questions we create a ﬁnancial literacy
‘score’ taking a value of 0–3 (the mean value is 1.75).
In addition to these questions, all respondents are asked about their ﬁnancial edu-
cation while in full-time education which we later use as an instrument for current
ﬁnancial literacy:
. ‘When you were in full time education (school, college or university) how much of
your education was devoted to ﬁnance, economics and business?’
– A lot
– Some
– A little
– Hardly at all
From answers to this question we create the variable ‘Financial education in
school’, which is coded from 1 (‘Hardly at all’) to 4 (‘A lot’).
All respondents are also asked about their use of credit counseling. The question
asked is:
. ‘Have you contacted anyone in the last 6 months to seek professional advice to help
sort out any debt problems?’
Credit counseling 471
to which respondents answer ‘yes’ or ‘no’. We use this binary indicator as our main
outcome variable for whether an individual has sought credit counseling.
The question itself does not uniquely identify credit counseling providers, but in
answers to a follow-up question on where the individual sought advice, 74% of
respondents state the name of a credit counseling provider and a further 10% state
they sought advice from their bank or credit provider. In such cases UK banks and
credit providers routinely refer-on individuals to a credit counseling provider.
Hence, we are conﬁdent that, in the large majority of cases, answers to this question
identify seeking advice from a credit counselor. In all cases, individuals naming a
credit counselor cited an organization or agency providing online or telephone coun-
seling services.
In addition to these questions the survey includes a range of questions covering the
individual’s demographic and socio-economic characteristics including age, gender,
marital status, children within the household, educational background, income and
employment. The survey also includes a series of questions on ‘shocks’ the household
faced within the previous 6 months. We describe additional questions we use as instru-
ments later in the results sections.
3.2 Summary statistics
Summary sample statistics for our analysis are provided in the ﬁrst column of Table 1.
The sample of 1,268 households comprises those among a representative sample of
the UK population who report they struggle to meet their bills and credit commit-
ments at least ‘occasionally’. Our sample comprises mostly working age respondents,
the majority of whom are married and one-third of whom have dependent children.
Nearly three quarters of respondents are employed and close to half has a spouse
or partner who is also employed. Approximately half of respondents are home owners
with mortgage debt.
Average household income is close to the UK average at £33,000 with individuals
on average holding approximately £3,500 in liquid savings and consumer credit debt
plus mortgage debt of approximately £26,000. When we compare our sample with a
representative sample of UK households in the ‘Wealth and Assets Survey’, we see
that respondents in our survey are typically younger, have higher income, are more
likely to have children and are more likely to be in employment. This is as expected
as theory suggests young to middle aged households are likely to hold the highest level
of secured and unsecured debts.
Column 2 splits the analysis sample into two mutually exclusive and exhaustive
groups by whether they recently sought credit counseling. Approximately 15% of
the analysis sample had sought counseling within the previous 6 months. Those seek-
ing credit counseling show very similar demographic characteristics in age, gender,
marital status and dependent children to those not seeking counseling. They are
slightly less likely to be employed or have a partner or spouse in employment.
Those seeking counseling are more likely to be private renters or social renters.
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Table 1. Sample characteristics
(1) (2) (3)
Sample
Credit counseling Debt problems
No Yes No Yes
Age
18–24 0.07 0.08 0.02 0.07 0.06
25–34 0.24 0.24 0.23 0.24 0.24
35–44 0.24 0.25 0.24 0.24 0.24
45–54 0.23 0.23 0.27 0.22 0.25
55+ 0.21 0.21 0.24 0.22 0.20
Demographics
Male (=1) 0.44 0.43 0.45 0.45 0.41
Married/living as married (=1) 0.64 0.65 0.60 0.67 0.59
Divorced (=1) 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.07
Dependent children (=1) 0.29 0.28 0.30 0.27 0.31
Financial education in school (1–4) 1.44 1.45 1.37 1.47 1.40
Employment
Employed (=1) 0.72 0.72 0.69 0.76 0.63
Unemployed (=1) 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.05 0.08
Retired/student/housewife/disabled 0.23 0.22 0.24 0.19 0.29
Spouse employed (=1) 0.49 0.49 0.44 0.52 0.42
Housing
Homeowner without mortgage (=1) 0.14 0.15 0.05 0.16 0.10
Homeowner with mortgage (=1) 0.47 0.48 0.39 0.50 0.40
Private renter (=1) 0.22 0.20 0.30 0.20 0.25
Social renter including rent-free (=1) 0.18 0.17 0.27 0.14 0.25
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Table 1 (cont.)
(1) (2) (3)
Sample
Credit counseling Debt problems
No Yes No Yes
Household ﬁnances
Household income (£) 33,200 (30,000) 33,800 (30,000) 29,600 (25,000) 35,900 (33,000) 28,500 (25,000)
Liquid savings (£) 3,500 (0) 3,800 (0) 1,500 (0) 4,700 (100) 1,300 (0)
Consumer credit debt (£) 3,400 (0) 3,000 (0) 6,200 (900) 2,700 (0) 4,700 (500)
Secured credit (£) 25,700 (0) 25,600 (0) 26,200 (0) 27,500 (0) 22,300 (0)
Observations 1,268 1,106 162 819 449
Note: Column 1 shows summary statistics for the whole sample of respondents. Column 2 separates the sample into two mutually exclusive groups by
whether the respondent had sought professional credit counseling advice about their debt problems within the last 6 months. Column 3 separates the
sample into two mutually exclusive groups by whether the respondent self-reports that they currently have a debt problem (see main text for deﬁnition
of ‘debt problems’).
Mean values are reported with median values shown in parentheses for ﬁnancial variables.
Source: YouGov Debt Tracker, October 2010.
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They have lower incomes, less savings and approximately twice the consumer credit
debt of those not seeking counseling.
Column 3 provides further summary statistics by whether the individual has a ‘debt
problem’. An individual is classed as being in the ‘debt problem’ group if they struggle
to meet their bills and credit commitments more frequently (answers 3, 4 and 5 of the
question how respondents keep up with their ﬁnancial obligations). Hence individuals
who report they struggle to meet their bills and credit commitments only ‘from time to
time’ (answer 2) comprises the ‘no’ group shown in the table. Summary statistics for the
mutually exclusive and exhaustive groups show that the two groups are similar in age.
Those with debt problems are slightly more likely to be female, less likely to be married,
less likely employed and more likely to be a private renter or social renter. They receive
on average less income, hold lower savings with more consumer credit debt.
Table 2 provides summary data for responses to the ﬁnancial literacy questions. We
show the three ﬁnancial literacy questions which form the basis of our ﬁnancial liter-
acy score together with a breakdown of responses among each of the groups shown in
Table 1. Overall 84% of individuals answer the ﬁrst ‘simple interest’ question correct-
ly; 52% answer the compound interest question correctly and 42% answer the min-
imum payments question correctly. In the whole sample the average literacy score
is 1.75. The average literacy score is lower for those with debt problems (1.66 for
those with debt problems compared with 1.81 for those without debt problems) and
also lower for those seeking credit counseling (1.45 for those seeking counseling com-
pared with 1.80 for those not seeking counseling).
On the basis of these summary data it is perhaps unsurprising that those seeking
credit counseling have, on average, lower ﬁnancial literacy because credit counseling
correlates with debt problems. Table 3 shows this correlation by tabulating the credit
counseling dummy variable against categorical answers to the question used to iden-
tify debt problems. Among the 819 individuals reporting they ‘struggle from time to
time’ only 45 (5.5%) seek credit counseling, whereas among the 54 individuals with
‘real ﬁnancial problems’ 32 (60%) seek credit counseling.
Our deﬁnition of the relevant ‘debt problem’ group is subject to judgment. Our
baseline deﬁnition comprises those answering 3, 4 or 5 to the question given in
Table 3, among which 117 out of 449 (26%) seek credit counseling. Later in our sen-
sitivity analysis we also employ a narrower deﬁnition of ‘debt problem’ which cap-
tures only respondents who state they are ‘falling behind with commitments or
have ‘real ﬁnancial problems’ (answers 4 and 5). This group includes 118 individuals,
26% of the wider deﬁnition debt problem group. These summary data, therefore,
show a similar pattern in differences between those who do and do not seek credit
counseling and those who do and do not have debt problems.
Later, we also use another alternative measure of problem debt based on whether
the individual reports their ﬁnancial situation is worse than 12 months ago. A speciﬁc
survey question asks respondents to describe their ﬁnancial position compared with a
year ago. Among ﬁve possible answers the ‘worst’ is: ‘I/we were in ﬁnancial difﬁculties
12 months ago and things are now even worse’. We use this as an alternative deﬁnition
of (potentially more severe) problem debt. 32% of those in the debt problem group
answer ‘yes’ to this question as do 29% of those seeking credit counseling.
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Summary data for these three deﬁnitions of debt problems we use in the analysis are
shown in Table 4. Our baseline measure of debt problems is the broadest measure,
capturing 35% of the sample, the narrower deﬁnition captures 9% of the sample
and the deﬁnition based on worsening ﬁnancial situation captures 14% of the sample.
In this table, we also provide summary data for the three household level shocks
which we use as instruments in our selection model for debt problem to capture ex-
ogenous sources of debt problems unrelated to ﬁnancial literacy. These are: whether
the individual experienced an employment shock, income shock or health shock
Table 2. Financial literacy performance
(1) (2) (3)
Sample
Credit
counseling
Debt
problems
No Yes No Yes
1. ‘Cheryl owes £1,000 on her bank overdraft and the interest rate she is charged is 15% per year.
If she did not pay anything off, at this interest rate, how much money would she owe on her
overdraft after one year?’
£850 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02
£1,000 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.01
£1,150 0.84 0.85 0.79 0.87 0.80
£1,500 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.08 0.09
Do not know 0.06 0.06 0.09 0.05 0.08
2. ‘Sarah owes £1,000 on her credit card and the interest rate she is charged is 20% per year
compounded annually. If she did not pay anything off, at this interest rate, how many years
would it take for the amount she owes to double?’
Less than 5 years 0.52 0.54 0.43 0.56 0.46
Between 5 and 10 years 0.28 0.28 0.30 0.28 0.29
More than 10 years 0.06 0.05 0.08 0.04 0.08
Do not know 0.14 0.13 0.19 0.12 0.17
3. ‘David has a credit card debt of £3,000 at an annual percentage rate of 12% (or 1% per month).
He makes payments of £30 per month and does not gain any charges or additional spending
on the card. How long will it take him to pay off this debt?’
Less than 5 years 0.05 0.04 0.07 0.03 0.07
Between 5 and 10 years 0.15 0.15 0.19 0.14 0.18
More than 10 years 0.18 0.18 0.20 0.19 0.17
None of the above, he will continue to be in debt 0.42 0.43 0.33 0.45 0.37
Do not know 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.19 0.21
Literacy score (0–4) 1.75 1.80 1.45 1.81 1.66
Observations 1,268 1,106 162 819 449
Note: Table shows breakdown of answers to ﬁnancial literacy questions. Column 1 shows sta-
tistics for those individuals who sought credit counseling within the last 6 months. Column 2
shows statistics respondents who self-report that they currently have a debt problem.
Literacy score is the sum of ﬁnancial literacy questions answered correctly (see main text for
details). Italics denote correct answers.
Source: YouGov Debt Tracker, October 2010.
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within the previous 6 months. We argue below that these shocks are causes of debt
problems but are unrelated to ﬁnancial literacy. Among our whole sample 9% of
respondents had experienced an employment shock, 25% an income shock and 4%
a health shock. The high rates of suffering an income shock are unsurprising as our
sample period occurs during a recession in the UK economy. Summary data show
rates of experiencing each shock are higher among individuals in the problem debt
group compared with those without problem debt.
Table 3. Debt problem characteristics by whether respondent sought credit counseling
Credit counseling
TotalNo Yes
‘Which one of the following statements best describes how well you (and your partner) are
keeping up with your bills and credit commitments at the moment?’
Answer (2) struggle from time to time 774 45 819
Answer (3) constant struggle with commitments 267 64 331
Answer (4) falling behind with commitments 43 21 64
Answer (5) real ﬁnancial problems 22 32 54
Total 1,106 162 1,268
Note: Table shows the number of individuals seeking credit counseling by answers to the
multiple-choice question ‘how are you keeping up with your bills and credit commitments
these days’. We deﬁne the ‘debt problems’ group as individuals answering 3, 4 or 5. Our nar-
rower deﬁnition of ‘debt problems’ is deﬁned as individuals answering 4 or 5.
Source: YouGov Debt Tracker, October 2010.
Table 4. Financial behavioral characteristics and household shocks
(1) (2) (3)
Sample
Credit
counseling
Debt
problems
No Yes No Yes
Debt problems
Debt problems (=1) 0.35 0.30 0.72 0.00 1.00
Debt problems, narrower deﬁnition (=1) 0.09 0.06 0.33 0.00 0.26
Financial situation worse than 12 months ago (=1) 0.14 0.12 0.29 0.04 0.32
Shocks to the household
Employment shock (=1) 0.09 0.09 0.14 0.06 0.15
Income shock (=1) 0.25 0.24 0.29 0.20 0.33
Health shock (=1) 0.04 0.03 0.10 0.01 0.08
Observations 1,268 1,106 162 819 449
Mean values reported.
Source: YouGov Debt Tracker, October 2010.
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We later use these shocks as instruments in the selection model for the debt problem
group. In doing so, we assume that each of the shocks is unrelated to ﬁnancial literacy.
The prior literature has shown that ﬁnancial literacy is important for a range of house-
hold outcomes, including long-term saving, portfolio allocation and consumer credit
and debt decisions. While ﬁnancial literacy correlates with human capital and hence
labor market status and the level of income we consider it to be less plausible that ﬁnan-
cial literacy is related to shocks to these. Similarly, we do not expect that ﬁnancial lit-
eracy is related to the likelihood of an individual receiving a shock to their health.
However, to test whether this is the case, we show estimates from an ordered probit
model in the appendix (Table A1) in which the dependent variable is our ﬁnancial lit-
eracy index and the set of independent variables includes our three shock variables
together with a rich set of socio-economic controls. Results show that none of the
coefﬁcients on the shock variables are statistically signiﬁcant and hence indicate no
causality between experiencing an employment, income or health shock and an indi-
vidual’s ﬁnancial literacy. On this basis we judge these shocks to be suitable exclusion
restrictions for our selectivity correction which identiﬁes exogenous causes of debt
problems arising independently of ﬁnancial literacy.
4 Empirical strategy and econometric results
We now formally present our empirical strategy. Our interest is in understanding how
ﬁnancial literacy affects the decision to seek credit counseling. Summary statistics indi-
cate that individuals seeking credit counseling typically have both debt problems and
lower literacy. Hence, in order to estimate the impact of ﬁnancial literacy on credit
counseling, an empirical approach needs to be adopted which accounts for this poten-
tial selection bias. A randomized control trial in which a group of individuals with vary-
ing levels of ﬁnancial literacy are randomly assigned debt problems is not possible.
We use a dual estimation strategy to address endogeneity concerns. The ﬁrst part
addresses the endogeneity of an individual’s debt problem to ﬁnancial literacy,
exploiting exogenous variation in the likelihood of a debt problem unrelated to ﬁnan-
cial literacy. We use a Heckman selectivity correction model with a selection equation
for the debt problem indicator variable, which uses recent shocks experienced by the
household as instruments. These shocks are measured by the dummy variables for em-
ployment shock, income shock and health shock described in Table 4. These shocks
affect the likelihood that an individual faces a debt problem, but are assumed inde-
pendent of the individual’s ﬁnancial literacy.
The probit model for credit counseling with sample correction for the likelihood
can be written as:
credit counseling = 1[β0 + β1FL+ X′β + u . 0], (1)
debt problem = 1[β0 + β1FL+ S′δ+ X′ω+ υ . 0], (2)
where (2) is the sample selection equation and the binary outcome variable credit
counseling is only observed when debt problem= 1. FL is the continuous measure
of ﬁnancial literacy, S′ a vector of the three exogenous shocks and X′ a vector of
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demographic and ﬁnancial control variables. The two equations are jointly estimated
using maximum likelihood. We report average marginal effects throughout the paper.
Table 5 column 1 shows results from a baseline probit model without the selectivity
correction (equation 1) as well as the selectivity correction model in Columns 2 and 3
(equations 1 and 2). In column 1, the dependent variable is the 1/0 dummy variable
for whether the individual has sought credit counseling. The model includes covari-
ates in age, gender, marital status, dependent children, employment, housing and
household ﬁnances. Coefﬁcient estimates for covariates show the likelihood of seeking
credit counseling is decreasing in homeownership and household income and increas-
ing in age and consumer credit debt.
The coefﬁcient on the literacy score variable is negative and statistically signiﬁcant
at the 0.1% level of conﬁdence. The average marginal effect takes a value of −0.043,
implying a one point increase in the literacy score is associated with a 4.3% point re-
duction in the likelihood of seeking credit counseling. The baseline predicted prob-
ability from the model is 12.8%, so the 4.3% point reduction is a 34% reduction in
the likelihood. This baseline estimate takes no account of the selection correction
described earlier.
Estimates from the selection correction model are shown in Columns 2 and 3, where
the employment shock, income shock and health shock dummies are used as instru-
ments in the ﬁrst-stage equation which predicts the likelihood of individuals having a
‘debt problem’. The income and health shock dummies are both statistically signiﬁ-
cant at the 1% level or lower. The marginal effects imply that experience of an income
shock raises the likelihood of debt problem by 10% points and experience of a health
shock raises the likelihood by 32% points. The baseline predicted probability of a debt
problem from the selection equation is 35%, hence the marginal effects of the instru-
ments are statistically large.
The second-stage regression is shown in Column 3. The Wald test of independence
rejects the null of non-independence of equations at a 3% level of conﬁdence. In this
model, the coefﬁcient on the ﬁnancial literacy score is negative and statistically sign-
iﬁcant at the 1% level. The value of the averaged marginal effect is −0.065, implying a
one point increase in the literacy score lowers the likelihood of an individual seeking
credit counseling by 6.5% points. Against the baseline predicted probability of 21.1%
this equates to a 31% decrease in the likelihood of seeking credit counseling.
These estimates suggest ﬁnancial literacy has a large negative effect on the likeli-
hood of seeking credit counseling and also suggest substitution between ﬁnancial lit-
eracy and credit counseling. These results show that, accounting for exogenous
selection into a debt problem, ﬁnancial literacy reduces use of credit counseling.
However, while this addresses the endogeneity of an individual’s ﬁnancial situation
to ﬁnancial literacy, the possible endogeneity of ﬁnancial literacy to exposure to credit
counseling remains a confounding factor in our estimates. In our cross-sectional data
we observe current ﬁnancial literacy and information of credit counseling received
within the previous 6 months. Credit counseling may improve (or possibly worsen)
ﬁnancial literacy, in which case our estimate of the relationship between ﬁnancial lit-
eracy and credit counseling would be biased upwards.
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Table 5. Credit counseling baseline and selectivity correction models
(1) (2) (3)
Baseline probit no
instruments
Selectivity correction model
First stage Second stage
β/SE Margin β/SE Margin β/SE Margin
Literacy score (0–4) −0.232*** (0.051) −0.043*** −0.075 (0.040) −0.024 −0.214** (0.071) −0.065**
Shocks: instruments in model (2)
Employment shock (=1) 0.247 (0.148) 0.080
Income shock (=1) 0.290** (0.094) 0.095**
Health shock (=1) 0.992*** (0.234) 0.323***
Age
18–24 −1.133*** (0.278) −0.211*** −0.356 (0.187) −0.116 −1.023** (0.400) −0.313**
25–34 −0.481** (0.164) −0.089** −0.090 (0.134) −0.029 −0.704** (0.248) −0.215**
35–44 −0.407* (0.164) −0.076* −0.084 (0.132) −0.027 −0.405 (0.238) −0.124
45–54 −0.189 (0.150) −0.035 0.053 (0.122) 0.017 −0.208 (0.213) −0.064
Housing
Homeowner without
mortgage (=1)
−0.928*** (0.206) −0.172*** −0.637*** (0.148) −0.207*** −1.257** (0.430) −0.384**
Homeowner with mortgage
(=1)
−0.399** (0.145) −0.074** −0.431*** (0.120) −0.140*** −0.112 (0.221) −0.034
Household ﬁnances
Household income (£10,000s) −0.231** (0.078) −0.043** −0.261*** (0.060) −0.085*** −0.190 (0.127) −0.058
Household income2 0.015* (0.007) 0.003* 0.014** (0.005) 0.005** 0.014 (0.010) 0.004
Consumer credit debt (£1,000s) 0.031*** (0.006) 0.006*** 0.032*** (0.006) 0.010*** 0.016 (0.011) 0.005
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Observations (censored) 1,268 1,268 1,268 (819)
Baseline predicted probability 0.128 0.354 0.211
LR χ2/Wald χ2 112.598 193.260 34.254
Wald test of independence 0.034
*p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001. Standard errors in parentheses.
Omitted variables: age: 55+; housing: renters. Further controls for gender, marital status, (spouse) employment status, dependent children and outstanding
secured credit.
Note: Table shows results from probit and Heckman selection correction models in which the dependent variable is a 1/0 dummy variable indicating
whether the respondent sought credit counseling from a professional advisor in the previous 6 months. Column 1 presents results from a probit
model without instruments. Columns 2 and 3 present results from a probit model with sample correction in which the selection equation instruments
the likelihood of the respondent having a ‘debt problem’ (which may be endogenous to ﬁnancial literacy), using shocks to the household as instruments.
Source: YouGov Debt Tracker, October 2010.
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The second part of our estimation strategy addresses this potential reverse causality
between credit counseling and ﬁnancial literacy by incorporating an IV model for
ﬁnancial literacy. The previous literature on ﬁnancial literacy has used alternative
instruments for current ﬁnancial literacy, including parental background (van Rooij
et al., 2011), mathematical ability (Jappelli and Padula, 2013) when young, and pre-
vious experience of education in economics and ﬁnance (Bernheim et al., 2001;
Lusardi and Tufano, 2009).
We follow Lusardi and Tufano (2009) by instrumenting current ﬁnancial literacy
using responses to the question on economics and ﬁnance education at school
described earlier. As Jappelli and Padula (2013) show, the ideal instrument for ﬁnan-
cial literacy is the pre-labor market entry endowment of literacy. This is determined
before exposure to the ﬁnancial environment which might cause literacy to form en-
dogenously. In our scenario, it is important that the instrument captures literacy
formed before exposure to problem debt and speciﬁcally credit counseling.
Financial education when young is appropriate in this context as it pre-dates problem
debt or credit counseling.
The model we estimate, therefore, combines a selectivity-correction in the assign-
ment into debt problem on the basis of ﬁnancial shocks with an instrumentation of
current ﬁnancial literacy using ﬁnancial education when young. This is a hybrid
of a Heckman selectivity correction model and an IV probit model and can be
written as:
FL = β0 + β1 education+ β2IMR+ X′β + ε, (3)
credit counseling = 1[β0 + β1FL+ β2IMR+ X′β + μ . 0],
where education is the continuous level of ﬁnancial education at school, which we use
as an instrument for ﬁnancial literacy. IMR is the ‘Inverse Mills Ratio’, which is the
sample selection correction term of the Heckman procedure before.1 Hence, this
hybrid approach is implemented by calculating the IMR from the selection equation
(2) and including it as an additional covariate in an IV probit model (this approach is
discussed in Ameniya, 1985). Equations (3) and (4) are then jointly estimated using
maximum likelihood estimation.
Table 6 shows results from this hybrid model. The coefﬁcient on the ﬁnancial edu-
cation instrument in the ﬁrst-stage regression in Column 1 is positive and statistically
signiﬁcant at the 0.1% level. The coefﬁcient value of 0.152 implies a one unit increase
in the instrument value (on the scale ‘hardly at all’, ‘a little’, ‘some’ and ‘a lot’) causes
a 0.15 unit increase in the ﬁnancial literacy score. In the second-stage regression, the
coefﬁcient on the instrumented ﬁnancial literacy score is negative and statistically
signiﬁcant at the 0.1% level of conﬁdence. The coefﬁcient on the literacy score is
−0.306, compared with −0.065 in the selectivity correction model in Table 4. This
conﬁrms our intuition that not instrumenting the ﬁnancial literacy score causes an up-
ward bias on this coefﬁcient arising from the reverse causality between credit counsel-
ing and ﬁnancial literacy. The coefﬁcient value of −0.306 implies a one unit increase
1 The IMR or ‘hazard rate’ is the ratio of the probability density function and the cumulative distribution
function evaluated at the predicted outcomes of (2), divided by the standard error of (2).
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in the ﬁnancial literacy score lowers the likelihood of an individual seeking credit
counseling by 31% points. Evaluated against a baseline likelihood of 46%, this is a
66% decrease in the likelihood of seeking credit counseling.
The result from the hybrid model shows that ﬁnancial literacy decreases the likeli-
hood that, for a given debt problem, an individual seeks credit counseling. Hence
ﬁnancial literacy and credit counseling are substitutes in consumer decisions. Our
data do not allow us to estimate whether ﬁnancial literacy and credit counseling
are substitutes in determining outcomes for individuals faced with problem debt –
Table 6. Credit counseling selectivity correction speciﬁcation with additional instrument
for ﬁnancial literacy
(1) (2)
Selectivity correction model with IV ﬁnancial literacy
First stage Second stage
β/SE β/SE Margin
Instrumented variable
Literacy score (0–4) −1.141*** (0.027) −0.306***
Instruments
Financial education in school (1–4) 0.152*** (0.030)
Inverse Mills Ratio 1.963*** (0.150) 2.124*** (0.254) 0.570***
Age
18–24 −0.729*** (0.127) −0.852*** (0.238) −0.229***
25–34 −0.317*** (0.089) −0.359** (0.127) −0.096**
35–44 −0.212* (0.090) −0.254* (0.120) −0.068*
45–54 −0.006 (0.080) −0.016 (0.098) −0.004
Housing
Homeowner without mortgage (=1) −0.662*** (0.126) −0.819*** (0.182) −0.220***
Homeowner with mortgage (=1) −0.399*** (0.096) −0.480*** (0.110) −0.129***
Household ﬁnances
Household income (£10,000s) −0.432*** (0.054) −0.485*** (0.059) −0.130***
Household income2 0.025*** (0.004) 0.028*** (0.004) 0.008***
Consumer credit debt (£1,000s) 0.048*** (0.005) 0.055*** (0.006) 0.015***
Observations 1,268 1,268
Baseline predicted probability 1.754 0.461
F-Statistic 10.270
Wald test of independence 0.000
*p< 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001. Standard errors in parentheses.
Omitted variables: age: 55+; housing: renters. Further controls for gender, marital status,
(spouse) employment status, dependent children and outstanding secured credit.
Note: Table shows results from a selectivity correction model (as in previous Table 5), in which
‘ﬁnancial literacy’ is also instrumented using ‘ﬁnancial education at school’. This is implemen-
ted by calculating the Inverse Mills Ratio from the selectivity correction model shown in
Table 5, Columns 2 and 3 and then including it as an additional control variable in the two-
stage IV speciﬁcation in order to implement the selectivity correction.
Source: YouGov Debt Tracker, October 2010.
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we do not know whether own ﬁnancial literacy compared with credit counseling ad-
vice from an organization or agency are more or less effective for helping consumers
address their debt and credit problems. Our results do allow us to conclude, however,
that lack of ﬁnancial literacy is not a barrier to seeking advice. Lack of ﬁnancial lit-
eracy could potentially leave consumers unable to understand the appropriate form of
assistance they require to help them address their debt problems. Our results show this
ignorance hypothesis is not borne out in our data.
5 Sensitivity analysis
In this section, we present estimates from alternative model speciﬁcations to ensure
that our central results are not sensitive to choice of exclusion restrictions in the selec-
tion equation or to our deﬁnition of ‘debt problem’. Table A2 presents model esti-
mates in which we omit the income and employment shock variables as exclusion
restrictions. Hence, the single exclusion restriction in this model arises from the health
shock variable. We do so as arguably income and employment shocks might arise due
to poor ﬁnancial literacy, whereas it would seem highly unlikely that health shocks
could arise due to poor ﬁnancial literacy. In this speciﬁcation, the coefﬁcient on the
health shock dummy variable is statistically signiﬁcant at the 0.1% level, and the
coefﬁcient and standard error values are very similar to our model in Table 5 (coefﬁ-
cient 1.111, standard error 0.367). Results in Column 2 show the IMR remains sign-
iﬁcant in the second-stage regression and the marginal effect on the instrumented
ﬁnancial literacy score variable of 0.328 is very close to the value of 0.306 in our cen-
tral model (Column 2, Table 6).
We also present model estimates using alternative deﬁnitions of ‘debt problem’
explained earlier. Table A3 presents results in which ‘debt problem’ is deﬁned using
the narrower deﬁnition of stating answers 4 or 5 to the survey question on ability
to repay bills and credit commitments as shown in Table 3 earlier. By this narrow
deﬁnition only 9% of our sample is classed as exhibiting a problem debt compared
with 35% for the wider deﬁnition in the central estimates. Table A3 shows results
are very similar to our central estimates. In these results, the coefﬁcient on the literacy
score variable is again negative and statistically signiﬁcant at the 0.1% level of conﬁ-
dence. The average marginal effect value of −0.294 is very similar to the equivalent
value of −0.306 from the previous hybrid model in Table 6. The baseline predicted
probability from this model is 47%, hence a one unit increase in the literacy score
causes a 63% reduction in the likelihood of seeking credit counseling, near identical
to the 66% reduction from the previous model.
Table A4 presents results using our third deﬁnition of debt problem based on
whether the survey respondent states their ﬁnancial situation is worse than 12 months
previously. 14% of individuals report this to be the case and are coded into the debt
problem group for the estimates as shown in this table. Arguably, individuals who
persistently report they face problems repaying their credit commitments and bills
may exhibit long-term lack of income or poverty for which credit counseling may
not be appropriate. The new measure might better capture transitory events which
may be more readily addressed via credit counseling.
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In these results, the coefﬁcient in the second-stage regression estimates is very simi-
lar to those in the previous two models. The coefﬁcient on the instrumented ﬁnancial
literacy score is negative and statistically signiﬁcant at the 0.1% level. The coefﬁcient
value of 0.299 implies a one unit increase in ﬁnancial literacy lowers the likelihood of
seeking credit counseling by 64%. Taken together, results from these sensitivity checks
show the estimated coefﬁcients of interest are not sensitive to the choice of shock vari-
ables in the selection equation or alternative deﬁnitions of ‘debt problem’ in the
ﬁrst-stage selection equation.
6 Conclusion
This paper has estimated the impact of ﬁnancial literacy on the demand for profes-
sional ‘credit counseling’ among consumers facing ﬁnancial problems. It used a
unique UK survey dataset of indebted individuals into which we inserted survey ques-
tions on ﬁnancial literacy and other behavioral characteristics of consumers. It
allowed for both the endogeneity of an individual’s debt problems to ﬁnancial liter-
acy, and the endogeneity of ﬁnancial literacy to exposure to credit counseling, and
showed that, for a given debt problem, ﬁnancial literacy decreased the likelihood of
an individual seeking help and assistance from a credit counselor by approximately
60%. This result supports the view that credit counseling is a substitute, and maybe
a safety net, for poor ﬁnancial literacy. We subject this view to various sensitivity ana-
lyses which conﬁrm the robustness of this conclusion.
What are the policy implications of our ﬁndings? We conﬁrm the ﬁndings in the
existing literature that levels of ﬁnancial literacy are strongly linked to prior ﬁnancial
education, and, indirectly, that ﬁnancial literacy may have an impact on ﬁnancial
decision-making. However, prior ﬁnancial knowledge may not of itself be sufﬁcient
to avoid households encountering debt problems arising from exogenous shocks to
household circumstances, such as health shocks and income shocks. The latter are
particularly pertinent in the post-2007 period of macroeconomic instability; a period
covered by our data. Hence there is a social need for further provision of ﬁnancial ad-
vice, such as credit counseling, that is triggered by adverse shocks to the household.
The issue that concerns us here is whether such advice is essentially complementary
to, or a substitute for, accrued ﬁnancial literacy among individuals. Arguably, the
‘value added’ of such advice is the greatest to those with the least ﬁnancial expertize
(indeed, if it was complementary to existing knowledge, one might question the use-
fulness of that accrued ﬁnancial literacy). Our results strongly suggest that credit
counseling is utilized disproportionately by those with less ﬁnancial literacy, acting
as a valuable ‘safety net’ in the context of household debt problems.
Much of the existing literature that has focused on pre-determined drivers of ﬁnan-
cial literacy, such as ﬁnancial education, and has concentrated on active ﬁnancial
decisions that are taken by households, such as saving choices. Rather less attention
has been paid to actions of households consequent upon adverse shocks to the house-
hold. Moreover, the average effects of interventions such as early-life ﬁnancial educa-
tion conceal variations in outcomes in terms of ﬁnancial literacy. Credit counseling
therefore serves as an important and distinct component of ﬁnancial advice, not
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only because it is an explicit response to adverse outcomes such as debt problems, but
also because of its potential back-up function for the less ﬁnancially literate, whether
or not such individuals have received prior ﬁnancial education. Showing, as we do
here, that credit counseling is a substitute for ﬁnancial literacy, does not suggest
that measures to increase the latter are not cost effective, but it does suggest that em-
phasis on ﬁnancial education at the expense of safety net mechanisms in the presence
of adverse shocks to households could be overstated given the likelihood of continued
variation in levels of ﬁnancial literacy across households.
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Table A1. Determinants of ﬁnancial literacy
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Ordered probit
β/SE
Literacy = 0
margins
Literacy = 1
margins
Literacy = 2
margins
Literacy = 3
margins
Age
18–24 −0.289* (0.143) 0.046* 0.064* −0.016 −0.094*
25–34 −0.238* (0.099) 0.038* 0.053* −0.013* −0.078*
35–44 −0.068 (0.102) 0.011 0.015 −0.004 −0.022
45–54 −0.063 (0.095) 0.010 0.014 −0.004 −0.021
Demographics
Male (=1) 0.201** (0.064) −0.032** −0.045** 0.011** 0.066**
Married/living as
married (=1)
−0.007 (0.118) 0.001 0.002 −0.000 −0.002
Financial education
in school (1–4)
0.181*** (0.036) −0.029*** −0.040*** 0.010*** 0.059***
Employment
Employed (=1) 0.088 (0.080) −0.014 −0.020 0.005 0.029
Unemployed (=1) 0.308* (0.149) −0.049* −0.069* 0.017* 0.101*
Household ﬁnances
Household income
(£10,000s)
−0.034 (0.049) 0.005 0.008 −0.002 −0.011
Household income2 0.005 (0.004) −0.001 −0.001 0.000 0.001
Shocks to the houshold
Employment
shock (=1)
−0.091 (0.120) 0.015 0.020 −0.005 −0.030
Income shock (=1) −0.003 (0.076) 0.001 0.001 −0.000 −0.001
Health shock (=1) −0.210 (0.171) 0.034 0.047 −0.012 −0.069
Observations 1,268
LR χ2 61.541
Prob > χ2 0.000
Baseline predicted
probability
1.754
*p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001. Standard errors in parentheses.
Omitted variables: age: 55+. Further controls for spouse employment status, dependent children
and being divorced.
Note: Table shows the results from an Ordered Probit model in which the dependent variable is
the ﬁnancial literacy score (number of ﬁnancial literacy questions answered correctly on a scale
of 0–3. Financial education in school is the self-reported extent of education in ﬁnance and/or
economics during compulsory schooling (for full question see main text).
Source: YouGov Debt Tracker, October 2010.
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Table A2. Robustness analysis: health shock is single instrument for selectivity
correction with IV ﬁnancial literacy estimates
(1) (2)
Selectivity correction model with IV ﬁnancial literacy
First stage Second stage
β/SE β/SE Margin
Instrumented variable
Literacy score (0–4) −1.177*** (0.058) −0.328***
Instruments
Financial education in
school (1–4)
0.136*** (0.029)
Inverse Mills Ratio 3.351*** (0.183) 4.018*** (0.273) 1.121***
Age
18–24 −1.081*** (0.142) −1.176*** (0.262) −0.328***
25–34 −0.415*** (0.089) −0.436** (0.136) −0.122**
35–44 −0.337*** (0.089) −0.366** (0.126) −0.102**
45–54 0.004 (0.076) −0.025 (0.098) −0.007
Housing
Homeowner without
mortgage (=1)
−1.230*** (0.185) −1.448*** (0.204) −0.404***
Homeowner with mortgage (=1) −0.767*** (0.128) −0.916*** (0.120) −0.256***
Household ﬁnances
Household income (£10,000s) −0.692*** (0.083) −0.812*** (0.068) −0.227***
Household income2 0.039*** (0.005) 0.046*** (0.005) 0.013***
Consumer credit debt (£1,000s) 0.077*** (0.009) 0.090*** (0.008) 0.025***
Observations 1,268 1,268
Baseline predicted probability 1.754 0.478
F-Statistic 8.867
Wald test of independence 0.000
*p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001. Standard errors in parentheses
Omitted variables: age: 55+; housing: renters. Further controls for gender, marital status,
(spouse) employment status, dependent children and outstanding secured credit.
Note: Table shows results from a robustness speciﬁcation of the selectivity correction model
with instrumentation as in Table 6. Here, the selectivity correction model uses only an experi-
enced health shock as instrument.
Source: YouGov Debt Tracker, October 2010.
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Table A3. Robustness analysis: narrower deﬁnition of ‘debt problems’, selectivity
correction with IV ﬁnancial literacy estimates
(1) (2)
Selectivity correction model with IV ﬁnancial literacy
First stage Second stage
β/SE β/SE Margin
Instrumented variable
Literacy score (0–4) −1.104*** (0.030) −0.294***
Instruments
Financial education in
school (1–4)
0.159*** (0.030)
Inverse Mills Ratio 0.979*** (0.110) 1.012*** (0.172) 0.270***
Age
18–24 −0.520*** (0.128) −0.582* (0.243) −0.155*
25–34 −0.504*** (0.097) −0.529*** (0.120) −0.141***
35–44 −0.159 (0.093) −0.183 (0.120) −0.049
45–54 −0.168* (0.084) −0.180 (0.094) −0.048
Housing
Homeowner without
mortgage (=1)
−0.776*** (0.153) −0.878*** (0.182) −0.234***
Homeowner with mortgage (=1) −0.173 (0.092) −0.214 (0.110) −0.057
Household ﬁnances
Household income (£10,000s) −0.286*** (0.049) −0.306*** (0.057) −0.082***
Household income2 0.021*** (0.004) 0.023*** (0.005) 0.006***
Consumer credit debt (£1,000s) 0.032*** (0.005) 0.035*** (0.006) 0.009***
Observations 1,268 1,268
Baseline predicted probability 1.754 0.465
F-Statistic 7.428
Wald test of independence 0.000
*p < 0.05; **p < 0.01l ***p < 0.001. Standard errors in parentheses
Omitted variables: age: 55+; housing: renters. Further controls for gender, marital status,
(spouse) employment status, dependent children and outstanding secured credit.
Note: Table shows results from a robustness speciﬁcation of the selectivity correction model
with instrumentation (Table 6). Here, the dependent variable is our narrower deﬁnition of
debt problems: a dummy variable whether subjects answer ‘falling behind with commitments’
or ‘real ﬁnancial problems’ to their debt problem characteristics (Table 3).
Source: YouGov Debt Tracker, October 2010.
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Table A4. Robustness analysis: alternative deﬁnition of ‘debt problems’, selectivity
correction with IV ﬁnancial literacy estimates
(1) (2)
Selectivity correction model with IV ﬁnancial literacy
First stage Second stage
β/SE β/SE Margin
Instrumented variable
Literacy score (0–4) −1.108*** (0.036) −0.299***
Instruments
Financial education in school
(1–4)
0.158*** (0.030)
Inverse Mills Ratio 0.900*** (0.100) 0.948*** (0.138) 0.253***
Age
18–24 −0.396** (0.125) −0.452 (0.261) −0.120
25–34 −0.374*** (0.093) −0.398** (0.128) −0.106**
35–44 0.044 (0.092) 0.030 (0.134) 0.008
45–54 −0.013 (0.082) −0.020 (0.098) −0.005
Housing
Homeowner without
mortgage (=1)
−0.216 (0.112) −0.306 (0.204) −0.082
Homeowner with mortgage (=1) −0.046 (0.087) −0.085 (0.118) −0.023
Household ﬁnances
Household income (£10,000s) −0.214*** (0.044) −0.235*** (0.060) −0.063***
Household income2 0.013*** (0.003) 0.014** (0.005) 0.004**
Consumer credit debt (£1,000s) 0.031*** (0.005) 0.035*** (0.007) 0.009***
Observations 1,268 1,268
Baseline predicted probability 1.754 0.467
F-Statistic 8.320
Wald test of independence 0.000
*p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001. Standard errors in parentheses.
Omitted variables: age: 55+; housing: renters. Further controls for gender, marital status,
(spouse) employment status, dependent children and outstanding secured credit.
Note: Table shows results from a robustness speciﬁcation of the selectivity correction model
with instrumentation (Table 6). Here, the dependent variable is a dummy variable for answers
to the question ‘Is your ﬁnancial situation worse than it was 12 months ago?’ The variable takes
a value of 1 if the respondent answered ‘yes’ and 0 otherwise.
Source: YouGov Debt Tracker, October 2010.
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